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Introduction
The Lisbon Agenda and its updates have established the need for increasing 
the cooperation between the research community and industry (EU, 2006), the end 
being the establishment within the EU of the  “Knowledge Based Society” (EU, 
2003) with the final aim, to make Knowledge the basis of the EU economy. 
Based  on  these  intentions,  the  Commission  has  updated  its  tools  for 
promoting this end.  When looking at the changes the EU Framework Programme 
for Research and Technological Development (FP), has undergone since the 5
th FP, 
to the current FP7 one can see evidence to that effort. FP5 was a relatively simple 
framework with 5 programs included (FP5Programmes, 2009), four thematic 
programmes supporting research:
1) Quality of Life and management of living resources
2) User friendly information society (IST)
3) Competitive and sustainable growth (GROWTH)
4) Energy, environment and sustainable development (EESD)
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Abstract
Long-term R&D activities and especially Collaborative Research (CR) with other 
firms and with the academy are considered by nature as strategic. Such decisions not only 
commit resources like other decisions but also set a focus for the R&D units in the firm 
for the future. 
A recent research found that firms dealing with CR make decisions regarding 
participation with a limited number of management levels involved. This finding supports 
the claim that the CR participation decision is a strategic one and that the upper 
management should be aware of opportunities if they are to approve participation. 
This observation is important when dealing with the dissemination of such CR 
supporting programs, as is discussed in the last section of the article below.Added to them was the Euroatom programme as a research program (an 
optional   part   to   participants)   and   horizontal   programs   intending   to   supply 
additional activities (not thematic):
1) Confirming the role of community research (iNCO II)
2) Promotion   of   Innovation   and   encouragement   of   SME 
participation
3) Improving human research potential and the socio-economic 
knowledge base
4) Direct actions joint research centre.
This respectable FP with its thematic programmes and financial support 
models may have been deemed as complex, but it was nothing compared to FP6 
and FP7 that followed it. By adding the battle against brain drain and the emphasis 
on increasing the researcher mobility internationally, and between the sectors of 
academy and industry the relatively simple 3
rd horizontal programme has become a 
complex framework by itself  (EU FP7, 2009). 
The complexity of the thematic programmes has increased even more by 
turning them into 10 thematic programmes with additional super programmes 
dealing with regional development and scientific excellence.
While the purpose of this article is not to describe the evolution of the FP 
over the last decade or so, it serves to show that the issue of CR and its supportive 
programmes is complex. Another rule of thumb is the proliferation of consultants 
advising firms and research organizations regarding the FP and the fact that 
organizations dealing with these programmes on daily basis have created special 
divisions / offices to deal with it.
When dealing with Collaborative Research in the form discussed here, we 
refer to the cooperation in R&D among firms and academy bodies regarding 
generic technology, while the firms compete in the market place with their 
products (sometimes based on same generic technology). The CR is relatively new, 
emerging in both major areas for such cooperation, the US and the EU, only since 
the mid-80’s (Miyagiwa and Ohno, 2002) following removal of restrictive laws. To 
further foster that action – deemed economically positive, the change in legislation 
allowed governing bodies to financially support CR. Which in turn created a fertile 
research environment for research into the economic nature of CR and the 
development of numerous models  (Katz, 1986; D’Aspremont, & Jacquemin, 1988; 
Kamien, Miller, and Zang, 1992; Laredo, 1998; Pastor & Sandonis, 2002). Some of 
the literature focused on different players (, Rosenberg, 1990; Lukkonnen, 1988), 
while other writer preferred to research different disciplines such as social and 
organizational theories (Thursby, Thursby, & Mukherjee, 2005; Stern & Pozner, 
2007) and even a few multi-disciplinary comprehensive models   (Doz, Olk, & 
Ring, 2000; Fontana, Geuna & Matt, 2006; Porath, 2008). 
The important nature of CR and its strategic implications regarding future 
generations of products, new markets and the activity of the firm made the decision 
process regarding entry or not into CR projects, very interesting.
Volume 10, Issue 5, December 2009              Review of International Comparative Management 952How   do   decisions   to   participate   or   not,   evolve   in   firms?   Does   the 
management level making the decision do it, based on familiarity with the 
programmes?
Ever since the firm was considered as making balanced and informed 
decisions (Penrose, 1959) it was understood that the decision-making organ within 
the firm requires some basic information in order to make a decision. This article 
will not go into the complicated world of decision making literature but will try 
and see how the involvement of high level management in the decision making 




Considering   the   above,   the   research   question   is:   Is   senior   level   of 
management involved in the decision to enter or not an R&D consortium?
This could be translated into working hypotheses:
1. High level management will be involved in decision making regarding CR 
consortium entry;
2. Few levels of management will be involved in making the entry decision into a 
CR consortium.
In companies where the upper level management is involved following 
discussion at several lower levels it can be argued that the upper level is not 
actually making the decision but rather ratifying it. In such cases the involvement 
of the senior level management is more in a mode of notification to it that the firm 
is about to engage in such an activity.   It stands to reason that when only one more 
level is involved that the senior management is actually the deciding body. 
Therefore the suggestion above is to check that senior management is involved and 
also how many levels are involved in the process. These two working hypotheses 
presented as questions will help answer the research question.
Instrument
As part of a large research into the forming mechanisms of R&D consortia, a 
questionnaire was developed and employed. This questionnaire was adapted from a 
validated   questionnaire   used   by   Dyer   and   Nobeoka   (2000).   The   original 
questionnaire referred to US registered consortia, organized voluntarily without 
government funding.  In this research the R&D consortia researched were part of the 
Israeli Magnet programme financed by the national government. The questionnaire 
was   adapted   to   these   specifications;   the   main   parameters   however,   remained 
unchanged. 
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The Israeli Magnet programme started operation in 1994 and has up to 2007 
initiated and financed under 40 (about 37) CR consortia. At the time 11 consortia 
were active and members of them could easily be identified   (Porath, 2004) 
covering most of the industrial areas existing in Israel. In recent years consortia 
have   been   formed   (approved   for   financing,   established   and   started   R&D 
operations) at the rate of 2-3 per year. The Israeli Magnet programme is defined as 
generic long term research, (no more than 30% of the firm’s research budget can be 
allocated for such consortia, per the programme regulations) which reduces the 
number of firms that are involved or are ready to be involved (Porath, 2004). 
The overall population identified included firm managers and project 
managers who were involved in the process of making the decision to join the 
consortium and have experience of its operation and functioning (due the high rate 
of personnel change in high tech companies during the 1990’s and early 2000’s), 
was estimated to be very small.  Firms participating in a consortium tended to 
participate in following consortia, which further reduced the number of potential 
responding persons.
Methodology
The rate of response was ninety-seven questionnaires received out of 220 
sent or handed out to members of Magnet consortia, making it a 44.1% response 
rate. Members could be identified of the 33 Magnet projects existing at the end of 
data collection (60%) of which members from 20 responded.  Tracking of members 
of the older and some others proved very hard due to the high rate of personnel 
change in the high-tech industry, firm mergers and dissolvent etc.  While some of 
the questionnaires were sent by mail, the most effective data collection method 
seemed to be combined of sending the questionnaires, interviewing the members 
and   filling   the   questionnaire   with   each   one.   The   director   manager   of   the 
programmes assisted by supplying a support letter but that proved as legitimizing 
step only,  not  sufficient  to  induce  the  potential responders into  filling the 
questionnaire wholly.  The sample consisted of different level managers involved 
in the decision-making and management of the consortia and the members in each 
consortium responding. Some of the responders were veterans of several consortia, 
while others were newcomers to the programme.
Statistically the analysis was adapted to the specific needs of the research. 
The parts relevant to this discussion are described in the section below. 
Results 
There were two questions in the questionnaire out of 25 complex questions 
related to management involvement in entry decision making. The results and the 
analysis of the two questions are presented below.
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Question 8 of the questionnaire referred to deciding on joining the 
consortium - Forming a committee rather the recommendation of a single person, 
to decide regarding joining a consortium. As the question offered a YES / NO 
choice the analysis refers to the number of responses in each direction. The 
involvement of a committee in the decision rather than a single person as a 
recommendation emphasizes the role of the management in the decision making 
and increases the support to the claim that this is a strategic decision, or is at least 
regarded so by the management. 
Table 1 – Q8 Statistics
Item Yes No
Will you form a committee? 64.8% 35.2%
As can be seen, in most firms the decision to enter a consortium would 
follow the evaluation work of a committee, an indication of the multi-departmental 
effort expected of such a decision.
The second question relevant to management involvement in decision-
making in the questionnaire (question 20), asked how many management levels 
would be required for approval of participation in the organization? 
This was an open question requesting the answering person to write a 
number. The answers varied between 1 and 3 with 2 getting 56.0% of the answers, 
1 getting 28.8% and 3 getting 15.2%. There were no more levels involved. As can 
be seen 1 and 2 levels were used in 84% of the cases.
Table 2 – Q20 statistics
Item Mean Median Mode SD
Two levels of management 1.87 2.00 2 0.655
Discussion and conclusions
The results show that in the most cases (over 84%) there were 1 or 2 levels 
of management involved in deciding to enter a CR consortium.  Further to that in 
most cases the decision was made following the work and recommendation of an 
internal interdisciplinary committee.  
It is important to bear in mind that the firms in the sample were not start-up 
firms, but rather more mature firms and therefore the assumption that the small 
number of management levels involved is due t the size of the firm is rejected. As 
the Israeli Magnet program regulations demand firms participating will spend no 
more of 30% on such generic R&D of their total R&D budget. The majority of the 
firms are medium-large according to Israeli standards, deal with export of their 
products or services, and in most projects relevant to telecommunications are 
players on the international level.  It is therefore safe to assume that the firms 
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requires a firm commitment regarding IPR issues that also assures that the levels 
involved are the top levels of management. 
The involvement of the top management in the decision is important when 
considering the dissemination of the information regarding he CR programmes. As 
mentioned   above   such   programmes   are   often   complex   in   their   regulations, 
application requirements, reporting and accounting.  That complexity which is the 
result of the different ends of such CR programmes.   The programmes while 
normally not as complex as the FP, are by the nature of the cooperation between 
different sectors (Industry and Academy) and the regulations imposed due to the 
government support, are naturally at least complex enough to require some delving 
into and learning of the regulations and by-laws. 
Some of the programmes, such as the Israeli Magnet Programme require 
the formation  of a special legal entity which complexes the administrative 
understanding required in order to make the join / not join decision.
While firms and especially firms from medium size and up, in the High-
Tech sectors are used to apply for R&D support for product development to 
different programs, the involvement with Generic research and specifically with 
CR is normally more limited. The effort required for participation in a CR is bigger 
than that of a single firm involved in individual R&D.  Therefore in most cases, 
firms will be involved in CR projects sequentially or in a limited extent. Therefore 
while the upper management may be familiar with and used to seeing requests for 
approval for individual R&D support, that is not the case with CR programmes. 
The result of the fact that management is less familiar or used to CR 
programmes   makes   the   decision   process   more   difficult   and   lengthy.   CR 
programmes promoters should take that into account. These promoters, being 
normally government agencies, should realise that in order to better promote their 
programmes   they   need   to   invest   effort   and   resources   in   “educating”   or 
disseminating programme related information to upper management. That is more 
difficult than disseminating the same information to R&D managers. Just getting 
the share of mind and time of the upper management is more difficult than the 
same action with R&D managers.
Limitations to the research
The sample size is a limitation to the research. However for our purposes 
and the type of analysis it can be claimed to be indicative in the way we wish to 
understand the operating mechanism.
Another limitation is the sector cover. Only a limited variety of sectors 
were covered, mostly in telecommunication and related sectors. The other sectors 
had limited if any representation in the Magnet programme consortia. However, 
considering the strategic nature of the decision discussed and the result of the 
sector covered that limitation does not seem too critical. In order to over come that 
limitation similar  research in programmes  covering more  sectors should be 
Volume 10, Issue 5, December 2009              Review of International Comparative Management 956pursued.  
Bibliography
1. D’Aspremont, C., & Jacquemin, A. (1988).  Cooperative and non-
cooperative R&D in duopoly with spillover.  The American Economic 
Review, 78, 1133–1137.
2. Doz, Y. L., Olk, P. M., & Ring, P. S. (2000). Formation processes of 
R&D consortia: Which path to take? Where does it lead?  Strategic 
Management Journal, 21, 239–266.
3. Dyer, J. H., & Nobeoka, K. (2000). Creating and managing a high 
performance  knowledge-sharing  network: The  Toyota  case.  Strategic 
Management Journal, 21, 345–367.
4. EU.   (2003).   Communication   from   the   Commission;   Investing   in 
research: an action plan for Europe. COM (2003) 226 final/2.
5. EU. (2006). Report of the CREST expert group on: Encourage the 
reform of public research centres and universities, in particular to promote 
transfer of knowledge to society and industry. Final report, March.
6. EU FP7- description downloaded from http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ on 
December 7
th 2009.
7. Fontana, R., Geuna, A., & Matt, M. (2006). Factors affecting university 
– industry R&D projects: The importance of searching, screening and 
signalling. Research Policy, 35, 309-323.
8. FP5   programmes   description   downloaded   from 
http://cordis.europa.eu/fp5/programmes.html on December 7
th 2009.
9. Kamien, M. I., Muller, E., & Zang, I. (1992). Research joint ventures 
and R&D cartels. The American Economic Review, 82(5), 1293–1306.
10. Katz,   M.   (1986).  An   analysis   of   cooperative   research   and 
development. Rand Journal of Economics, 17, 527–543.
11. Laredo, P. (1998). The networks promoted by the framework program 
and the questions they raise about its formulation and implementation. 
Research Policy, 27, 589–598.
12. Miyagiwa, K., & Ohno, Y. (2002).  Uncertainty, spillovers, and 
cooperative R&D. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20, 
855–876.
13. Pastor, M., & Sandons, J. (2002). Research joint ventures vs. cross 
licensing agreements: An agency approach.  International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 20, 215–249.
14.Penrose, E., T.  The theory of the growth of the firm. Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford UK, (1959).
15. Porath, A. (2004). Intellectual property by-laws in national and multi 
national programs: A comparison of the EU Framework Programs and 
the Israeli Magnet Program.  Proc. Inter. Conf. EARMA,  Bucharest, 
Review of International Comparative Management        Volume 10, Issue 4, October 2009 957Romania. 
16. Porath,   A.,  Joint   Venture   Forming   mechanisms   under   structured 
programs. working paper. Proc. PhD workshop at  Austauschprozesse: 
Extracting the value out of University-Industry Interaction. Muenster, 
Germany (2008). 
17. Stern, I., & Pozner, J. E., Organizational size, performance and frequency-
base   imitation:   A   test   of   competing   hypotheses.  ISC   conference, 
Jerusalem, Israel, 2007.
18. Thursby, M., Thursby, J. & Mukherjee, S. (2005)., Are there real 
effects of licensing on academic research? A life cycle view.  NBER 
Working Paper No. 11497.
Volume 10, Issue 5, December 2009              Review of International Comparative Management 958